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THE DEMISE OF FEDERAL TAKINGS LITIGATION
STEWART E. STERK'
ABSTRACT
For more than twenty years the Supreme Court has held that a
federal takings claim is not ripe until the claimant seeks com-
pensation in state court. The Court's recent opinion in San Remo
Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco establishes that the
federal full faith and credit statute applies to federal takings claims.
The Court itself recognized that its decision limits the availability of
a federal forum for takings claims. In fact, however, claim preclusion
doctrine-not considered or discussed by the Court-may result in
more stringent limits on federal court review of takings claims than
the Court's opinion anticipates. The counterintuitive result-that
federal takings claims must be litigated in state court-plays a
critical role in the Supreme Court's emerging takings jurisprudence,
which largely delegates to state courts the primary responsibility for
policing land use regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court decided three takings cases in 2005,
public attention focused almost exclusively on one, Kelo v. City of
New London,' in which the Court sustained the city's use of its
eminent domain power to take private land to stimulate economic
development. The second of the three cases, Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.,2 repudiated doctrinal statements that a takings claim
would lie when a landowner established that a regulation "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests"-statements that
had never formed the basis of a Supreme Court holding.3 From the
perspective of land use lawyers, the third case-San Remo Hotel,
L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco-is in many ways the most
significant, because its combination of ripeness and preclusion
doctrines appears to bar the door to federal court for virtually all
federal takings claims.4
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamil-
ton Bank of Johnson City, the Supreme Court held that because the
Takings Clause5 does not bar the states from taking property, but
instead prohibits the states from taking property without just
compensation, a federal takings claim is not ripe until the aggrieved
landowner has unsuccessfully sought just compensation through
available state procedures.6 Williamson County's ripeness require-
ment, then, requires a landowner to proceed-at least initially-in
state court.
In San Remo, however, the Court held that the full faith and
credit statute7 applies to state adjudications necessary to "ripen" a
1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
3. Id. at 2077 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)); see id. at 2082-
83.
4. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (2005).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
6. 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (requiring that acts and judicial proceedings in any state
"shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions").
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landowner's federal takings claim.' The Court emphasized that
the statute includes no exception that guarantees a federal fo-
rum to takings claimants who have been denied compensation in
state court.' The Court therefore affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision
holding that California issue preclusion doctrine barred a landowner
from bringing a federal takings claim in federal court after the
dispositive issues had been resolved in a state court proceeding.1 ° As
a result of San Remo, a state court denial of compensation can act
simultaneously to ripen, and to bar, any federal court takings claim.
Although the San Remo decision was unanimous, the decision's
implications left four concurring Justices discomfited by the
principle that "federal takings claims in particular should be singled
out to be confined to state court."11 Because these Justices fully
endorsed-and contributed to the development of-the preclusion
principles that led to the San Remo result, they called for reconsid-
eration of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine.12
Closer analysis reveals, however, that applying the full faith and
credit statute's preclusion principles to takings claims is more
complex than the Court's opinion suggests. The issues resolved by
a state court in the course of denying compensation to a landowner
will sometimes be different from the issues to be resolved in a
federal takings claim. As a result, issue preclusion doctrine, relied
on explicitly by the Ninth Circuit in San Remo and implicitly by the
Supreme Court, would leave many federal takings claims open to
federal litigation even after the state courts have finally rejected
state takings claims. But the gaps left open by issue preclusion
doctrine will quickly be closed by claim preclusion principles-not
relied on by the city and not discussed by the Court. The result will
be a nearly complete bar on duplicative federal litigation of takings
claims.
That result leads to an evaluation of the plea by the concurring
Justices for reconsideration of Williamson County's ripeness re-
quirement. That requirement has provoked consternation in two
8. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507.
9. Id. at 2501.
10. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364 F.3d 1088, 1096, 1098-99
(9th Cir. 2004).
11. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
12. Id. at 2510.
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separate legal communities. Land use lawyers, particularly those
who represent landowner interests, regard the decision as an
unwarranted obstacle to vindication of their clients' constitutional
rights. 3 Federal courts scholars treat Williamson County as a
puzzling exception to the ordinary principles governing federal
jurisdiction. 4 Especially in light of San Remo, then, Williamson
County is indeed "ripe" for reconsideration.
Reconsideration of the ripeness requirement, however, reveals
that it is not merely a barren formality, but instead an essential
pillar of the Court's emerging and unarticulated takings jurispru-
dence, which recognizes the primacy of background state law in
takings doctrine, and delegates to state courts the primary respon-
sibility for developing and enforcing limits on takings by state and
local governments. 5
I. TAKINGS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT:
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment prohibits takings
without just compensation."6 Section 1983 of the United States Code
13. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory
Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 99, 102 (2000) (describing how the ripeness requirement lays
an "insidious trap" for a landowner); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County's
Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions,
and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 210-11 (2003) (characterizing the effect of issue and claim
preclusion doctrine as pernicious, and complaining of injustice); Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness
and Forum Selection in Land-Use Litigation, in TAIUNGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLAN AND LUCAS 46, 67 (David L. Callies ed., 1996)
(explaining how Williamson County "perpetrates a fraud or hoax on landowners").
14. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:" Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 1211, 1264 (2004) (characterizing
Williamson County as a "stray" decision, possibly inconsistent with general principles of
federal jurisdiction); Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, State Law Wrongs, State Law
Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 989 (1986) ("No authority
supports use of ripeness doctrine to bar federal judicial consideration of an otherwise
sufficiently focused controversy simply because corrective state judicial process had not been
invoked.).
15. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 237-56 (2004).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("(Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
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imposes liability on persons-including, by judicial construction,
municipalities and other state agencies-who, acting under color of
state law, deprive others of rights secured by the Constitution and
federal laws."7 Taken together, these provisions make clear that a
municipality's alleged taking of private property raises a federal
question, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts."i
The Supreme Court, however, has significantly limited landowner
access to the federal courts in takings cases. First, in Williamson
County, the Court developed a "ripeness" doctrine that prevented
most landowner-plaintiffs from proceeding to federal court without
first objecting to municipal action in state court. 9 In response to
Williamson County, a number of landowners invoked an obscure
procedure first developed in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners"° to preserve their right to litigate federal
takings claims in federal court. Although that procedure persuaded
a number of federal courts, including the Second Circuit,2' the
Supreme Court all but barred the door on "England reservations" in
its recent San Remo opinion.
22
A. Williamson County
In the Williamson County case, the Court held that a Tennessee
landowner's federal takings claim is unripe until the landowner has
unsuccessfully sought just compensation through the procedures
made available by the state.23 Williamson County involved a
landowner's claim in federal district court for money damages
suffered when the planning commission allegedly took the land-
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
19. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95
(1985).
20. 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964).
21. Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003)
(allowing parties to "reserve their federal takings claims [if they inform all relevant] parties
that they intend to bring a federal takings claim in federal court once the litigation of the
state-law claim has been completed").
22. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005)
('The purpose of the England reservation is not to grant plaintiffs a second bite at the apple
in their forum of choice.").
23. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195, 200.
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owner's property in the course of applying local land use regulations
to the landowner's land.24 The Sixth Circuit upheld a jury award of
money damages to the landowner,25 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether governments must pay money
damages to landowners who have suffered a temporary taking.26
The Court never reached the damages issue. Instead, in an
opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court held the landowner's
claim unripe on two separate grounds. First, the Court held that a
takings claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations to the property at issue."2"
Because the landowner had not sought variances that might
have been available under state law, it could not conclusively
demonstrate that the commission would deny it all reasonable
beneficial use of its property, and could not, therefore, sustain a
takings claim.2" This requirement that the landowner seek and
obtain a "final decision" before pursuing a takings claim applies
equally whether it proceeds in state or federal court.29
But the Court also advanced a second ground for its conclusion
that the claim was unripe: the landowner had not availed itself of
Tennessee's procedures for obtaining just compensation. Tennessee
authorized landowners to bring "inverse condemnation" actions to
obtain just compensation for alleged takings affected by restrictive
zoning laws or development restrictions. ° The Court held that the
landowner "cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compen-
sation."3 This second prong of the Court's ripeness requirement
24. Id. at 175.
25. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 729 F.2d 402,409 (6th
Cir. 1984).
26. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 469 U.S. 815 (1984).
27. Wiliamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
28. Id. at 191.
29. See, e.g., Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 352 (2d Cir. 2005)
(federal); Patel v. City of Chicago, 383 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2004) (federal); Port Clinton
Assocs. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 587 A.2d 126, 138 (Conn. 1991) (state); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v.
Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 445 (Iowa 1996) (state).
30. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196.
31. Id. at 195.
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meant that, subject to limited exceptions,32 the landowner could not
prevail on a takings claim in federal court until it had failed in its
effort to obtain compensation through the state courts. But consider
the position of a landowner who brought an action in state court
to ripen its federal constitutional takings claim. Would the state
court's adverse determination preclude the landowner from raising
the same or similar claims in federal court, thus eliminating
entirely the landowner's access to federal court?3 3 The Court's
opinion in Williamson County never directly addressed that issue.
Williamson County's ripeness doctrine was developed, in large
measure, to avoid a hot controversy that was then brewing in the
land use community: were money damages available to landowners
when a municipality enacted what later proved to be an unconstitu-
tional land use regulation? 4 A number of state courts, including
those in California and New York, had held that money damages
were not available,35 and the Supreme Court had sidestepped the
issue twice in the five years before it decided Williamson County.3"
Had the Court concluded that the landowner's claim was ripe, it
would have been forced to decide the issue. By holding the claim
unripe, the Court postponed any decision on that issue. Two years
later in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
32. Of course, if the federal government committed the alleged taking, the plaintiff would
not have to proceed in state court. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987). And
until the Supreme Court decided, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082-85
(2005), that a claim that a regulation does not advance a legitimate state interest is not
cognizable under the Takings Clause, such "facial" takings claims were not subject to the
ripeness requirement. In Lingle, the Court held that a claim that a regulation does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest is not cognizable under the Takings Clause
and that such "facial" takings claims were not subject to the ripeness requirement.
33. For general discussion, see Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the
Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995).
34. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 570-601 (1984); Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use
Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,491 (1981); Stewart E. Sterk,
Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J. 113, 113, 115
(1984); Robert I. McMurray, Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The
Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV.
711, 713-15 (1981).
35. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980); Fred
F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389 (N.Y. 1976).
36. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
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Angeles, the Court held that money damages were indeed available
to an aggrieved landowner.87 After First English, the ripeness
doctrine was no longer a critical mechanism for avoiding a contro-
versial issue, but the doctrine nevertheless endured. Although the
Williamson County decision never mentioned preclusion, munici-
palities began to combine the ripeness requirement with preclusion
doctrine to eliminate federal takings litigation from federal court.
B. England Reservations
Williamson County's ripeness doctrine led thoughtful landowner
lawyers to develop strategies for preserving the right to litigate
takings claims in federal court. In a number of cases lawyers
sought to obtain preapproval from a state or federal court to reserve
the right to litigate federal takings claims after state court determi-
nations of all claims necessary to make those federal takings
claims ripe.38 The legal basis for this strategy was grounded in the
Supreme Court's opinion in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners.9
In England, the Court held that a plaintiff who initially raises a
federal claim in federal court, but is met with an abstention
doctrine that requires litigation of some issues in state court, may
reserve the right to litigate federal issues in federal court, even if
the state court has already determined those issues.40 England
involved no land use issues. Graduates of chiropractic schools had
brought a federal court action against the Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, seeking a declaration that a Louisiana statute
governing medical practice, as applied to chiropractors, violated the
37. 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
38. See, e.g., Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118,123-24 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting that the landowner believed his state law claims had to be unsuccessful before
he could initiate a federal takings claim); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 727
(3d Cir. 1989) (stating that applicants thought 'they were required to bring an inverse
condemnation action in New Jersey state court); Milliken v. Town of Addison, No. 3:02-CV.
1164-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17237, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2002) (holding "that plaintiff
must pursue an inverse condemnation action in state court and be deprived of just
compensation before" bringing a federal takings claim).
39. 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964).
40. Id. at 418, 421-22.
259
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Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.41 At the time the
plaintiffs brought the action, the Louisiana statute did not clearly
apply to chiropractors. As a result, the federal district court, sua
sponte, invoked the Pullman abstention doctrine and stayed the
federal proceeding, noting that the state court could end the
controversy by determining that chiropractors are not governed by
the statute.42
The England plaintiffs then brought an action in Louisiana state
court, raising two contentions: (1) the statutory question about the
scope of the Louisiana statute, and (2) the constitutional question
they had previously raised in federal district court.43 The Louisiana
courts resolved both questions against the plaintiffs, who then
returned to federal district court." That court dismissed the
complaint, holding that "the courts of Louisiana ha[d] passed on all
issues raised," and that the plaintiffs' failure to seek review of the
Louisiana determinations in the U.S. Supreme Court barred the
plaintiffs from any relief in federal court.45
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and directed the district court
to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' federal constitutional
claims.46 The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs had initially
chosen a federal forum, and wrote that "[t]here are fundamental
objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked
the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal
constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and
through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court's
determination of those claims."'47 The Court indicated that when the
application of abstention doctrine requires a federal plaintiff to
litigate in state court, the plaintiff "may inform the state courts that
he is exposing his federal claims" in state court only to enable the
state court to resolve state law issues in light of the federal claims,
and that the plaintiff "intends, should the state courts hold against
41. Id. at 412-13.
42. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); England v. La. State
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961) (per curiam).
43. England, 194 F. Supp. at 521.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 522.
46. England, 375 U.S. at 422-23.
47. Id. at 415.
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him on the question of state law, to return to the [federal] District
Court for disposition of ... federal" claims." Although the plaintiffs
in England itself had made no such reservation and had fully raised
the federal claims in state court, the Court held that, in light of
preexisting confusion about the steps necessary to preserve the right
to federal court review, the plaintiffs' actions should not foreclose
them from obtaining a federal district court adjudication on the
merits of their federal constitutional claim.49
Landowners seeking federal court adjudication of takings claims,
faced with the twin obstacles of ripeness and preclusion, turned to
"England reservations" as a mechanism for preserving the right to
federal court review. Of course, landowners had little reason to
proceed first in federal court, where their claims would immediately
be dismissed as unripe. 0 Instead, a number of landowners advanced
state statutory or constitutional challenges in state court, explicitly
indicating that they had chosen to reserve the right to litigate
federal claims in federal court."' In other cases, a landowner would
proceed to state court without making any explicit reservation, but
when the municipality defendant removed to federal court the
landowner-plaintiff requested that the federal court abstain.52 In
these cases, the plaintiffs combined the abstention motion with a
reservation of the right to litigate federal claims in federal court
after the state court had resolved all state law questions.53
48. Id. at 421 (citing Gov't & Civic Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957)). The Court emphasized that the plaintiff might have to raise federal claims in state
court in order to enable the state courts to construe state statutes in light of those claims. Id.
49. Id. at 422-23.
50. But see Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003) (declining
plaintiff's request to determine the effect of state court litigation on a future federal
proceeding); Bass v. City of Dallas, No. 3-97-CV-2327BD, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11263, at
*11 n.5 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs federal claim on ripeness grounds, and
noting that plaintiff may proceed in state court while reserving litigation of federal claims for
a subsequent federal court proceeding).
51. See, e.g., Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.
2003); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 727-28 (3d Cir. 1989); Fry v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 837 F. Supp. 330, 333 (D. Colo. 1991).
52. See, e.g., Milliken v. Town of Addison, No. 3:02-CV-1164-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17237, at **4-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2002); Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of Lansing, No. 5:98-
CV-109, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19058, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 1998).
53. See supra note 52.
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Judicial response to these England reservations was mixed. Some
courts-most notably the Second Circuit in Santini v. Connecticut
Hazardous Waste Management Service-enthusiastically endorsed
the use of the England procedure in takings cases. 4 But other
courts held that England reservations were limited to abstention
cases, and not available when the plaintiff's initial litigation was
brought in state court."5 Still other courts concluded that England
reservations did not bar preclusion of issues actually determined in
state proceedings.56 This divergence in views culminated in the
Supreme Court's review of the issue in the San Remo case.
C. San Remo
The litigation in San Remo had its genesis in a mistake the San
Remo Hotel made in filling out a city-mandated form.57 Concerned
about a shortage of residential housing, the City of San Francisco
instituted a moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units
into tourist hotel units.5 8 To enforce this provision, the city required
hotels to fill out reports listing the "number of residential and
tourist units in the hotel[] as of September 23, 1979.""s In filling out
the report, the San Remo Hotel erroneously reported that all of its
units were residential. That error led the city to zone the hotel as a
"residential hotel," which in turn required the hotel to obtain a
conditional use permit to do business as a "tourist hotel."' The
hotel's owners discovered the mistake in 1983 and protested the
residential use classification in 1987, but by then the period for
appealing the classification had expired.61 In 1990, the city strength-
ened its Hotel Conversion Ordinance, eliminating exceptions and
54. 342 F.3d at 128, 130; see also W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southampton, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 140, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Fry, 837 F. Supp. at 334.
55. See, e.g., Peduto, 878 F.2d at 729 n.5.
56. See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1998).
57. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2496 (2005).
58. Id. at 2495 (citing S.F., CAL., RESIDENTIAL HOTEL UNIT CONVERSION AND DEMOLITION
ORDINANCE, § 41.3(a)-(g)).
59. Id. at 2496 (quoting S.F., CAL., RESIDENTIAL HOTEL UNIT CONVERSION AND
DEMOLITION ORDINANCE, § 41.6(b)(1)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2496 n.2.
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increasing the size of the "in lieu" fee required of owners who
applied to convert residential units. 2
When the San Remo's owners applied for a conditional use permit
to convert all the hotel's rooms into tourist rooms, the City Planning
Commission, pursuant to the 1990 ordinance, required the hotel to
pay an "in lieu" fee of $567,000.63 The hotel brought an action in
federal court, alleging Takings Clause violations.' The court dis-
missed the takings claim on ripeness grounds, and on appeal the
hotel's owners asked the Ninth Circuit to abstain from deciding
their federal claims because a return to state court might moot
those claims. The Ninth Circuit agreed to abstain on the owners'
facial challenge, which the court concluded was ripe as soon as the
1990 ordinance was enacted, but it dismissed the "as applied" claims
as unripe under Williamson County.65 In a footnote, the Ninth
Circuit indicated that if the hotel's owners wanted to retain a right
to return to federal court for adjudication of their federal claim, the
hotel owners "must make an appropriate reservation in state
court. 6 6
The San Remo's owners then proceeded to state court, where they
made the appropriate reservation.67 In the state court litigation,
however, the owners framed their claims as state constitutional
claims but used language that tracked, federal constitutional
standards.68 Thus, they argued that imposition of a fee failed to
advance a legitimate government interest and that the amount of
the fee was not roughly proportional to the impact of the hotel's
proposed tourist use.69 The case ultimately reached the California
Supreme Court, which chose to "analyze [the] takings claim under
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2497. The hotel's owners also advanced due process and equal protection claims.
San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102-04 (9th Cir. 1998).
The due process claims were not heard on appeal and the Ninth Circuit invoked Younger
abstention doctrine with respect to the equal protection claim. Id. (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
65. San Remo, 145 F.3d at 1102.
66. Id. at 1106 n.7.
67. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 Cal. App. 4th 239, 242
(Cal. App. 2000).
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the relevant decisions of both this court and the United States
Supreme Court," while simultaneously noting that "no federal
question has been presented or decided in this case. ' That court
found no violation of the state constitution.7' The hotel's owners
then returned to federal court. The district court dismissed their
claims, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that California
takings law is coextensive with federal takings law and that issue
preclusion prevented the plaintiffs from relitigating takings claims
in federal court.v2 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict with the Second Circuit's decision in the Santini
case.
73
In affirming, the Court held that federal courts are not free to
disregard the full faith and credit statute in order to guarantee
takings plaintiffs a day in federal court.74 The Court observed that
the full faith and credit statute, as the Court has construed it in a
number of cases, often requires that state court determinations
preclude reconsideration of issues essential to adjudication of
federal claims.75 As the Court put it, "[t]he relevant question ... is
not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to a federal
forum; rather, the question is whether the state court actually
decided an issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment."76
The Court also held that England did not support the owners'
expectation that their reservation would negate the preclusive effect
of a state court judgment. The Court emphasized first that in
England the "state issue requiring abstention was distinct from the
reserved federal issue. '77 The England doctrine was designed to
facilitate Pullman abstention, the purpose of which was "not to
afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is
functionally identical to the federal question," but rather to permit
state courts to make a state law determination that would moot any
70. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643,649 n.1, 664 (Cal.
2002).
71. Id. at 679.
72. San Remo, 364 F.3d at 1098-99.
73. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004).
74. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. at 2505 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 2504.
77. Id. at 2502 (emphasis omitted).
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federal question.7" Finally, the Court noted that England itself
made the reservation of rights to litigate federal issues in federal
court available only to those plaintiffs who took no steps "to broaden
the scope of the state court's review beyond decision of the anteced-
ent state-law issue."79 By contrast, in San Remo the landowners
"effectively asked the state court to resolve the same federal issues
they asked it to reserve." °
The Court concluded by acknowledging that "a significant number
of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in
state courts. '8' To the plaintiffs' concern that giving preclusive effect
to state court proceedings that are required to ripen federal takings
claims is unfair, the Court responded: '"Whatever the merits of that
concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit
statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum. 82
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in a separate opinion joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. The concurring Justices
took no issue with the majority's treatment of the preclusion issue.83
Instead, they suggested that the Court reconsider the Williamson
County ripeness requirement, questioning "why federal takings
claims in particular should be singled out to be confined to state
court, in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional
directive."'
II. WHAT Is LEFT OF FEDERAL TAKINGS JURISDICTION?
Although the Court's opinion in San Remo emphatically rejected
the notion that takings plaintiffs have a right to federal adjudica-
tion, San Remo did not explicitly sound the death knell for all
federal takings claims. The Court did not close the doors to takings
claims that are ripe without state adjudication: claims of facial
invalidity.8" Moreover, even with respect to "as applied" challenges,
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2502-03.
80. Id. at 2503.
81. Id. at 2506.
82. Id. at 2507.
83. Id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2503 (majority opinion).
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the Court's opinion leaves open a number of questions about the
source and scope of preclusion principles that would apply. This
Part examines those issues.
A. Facial Challenges
1. The Demise of the "Substantially Advances" Challenge
In their original federal court action, the San Remo's owners
contended that the city ordinance constituted a facially unconsti-
tutional taking because the ordinance "fail[ed] to substantially
advance legitimate government interests."' In Yee v. City of
Escondido,87 the Court had held that such facial takings challenges
were not subject to Williamson County's ripeness rules because the
claims do "not depend on the extent to which petitioners are
deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of property or
the extent to which these particular petitioners are compensated."'
The Court reaffirmed that principle in San Remo. 9
Unfortunately for landowners, the Court decided another case
last term-Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.-in which the Court held
that such claims, however ripe, are not cognizable under the
Takings Clause. 9 In Lingle, the Court emphasized that it had never
held an ordinance invalid as a taking for failure to substantially
advance legitimate government interests,9 and concluded that
language in earlier cases suggesting that such a takings claim could
86. Id. at 2497 n.4.
87. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
88. Id. at 534.
89. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2503.
90. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2005).
91. Id. at 2082-83. As the Court noted in Lingle, the troublesome language originated in
the Court's opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), and was quoted in
subsequent decisions, largely in dicta. Id. at 2083. Courts of appeals, however, have relied on
the language to invalidate land use measures as unconstitutional takings. See, e.g., Cashman
v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2004) ("ITihe mere 'possibility' that a tenant
could capture part of the premium from a rent control ordinance is enough to render the
ordinance unconstitutional."); Beacon Hill Farm Assocs. II Ltd. P'ship v. Loudon County Bd.
of Supervisors, 875 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the claim is not premature
merely because it is brought before a final determination of the extent of the ordinance's
application to a specific piece of property").
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succeed was mistaken.92 The Court emphasized that a '"substan-
tially advances' inquiry... does not help to identify those regulations
whose effects are functionally comparable to government appro-
priation or invasion of private property," and hence "is tethered
neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justifica-
tion for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the
Clause."93
The result, then, is that challenges based on an ordinance's
failure to advance legitimate government interests can properly be
brought in federal court-but the federal court must then dismiss
them on the merits.
2. Taking Challenges Based on Per Se Rules
Unlike the "substantially advances" challenge rejected in Lingle,
most takings claims do require courts to assess the effect of the
government's action on the value of a landowner's land. The Penn
Central opinion,94 which the Court continues to treat as the
talisman for regulatory takings claims,95 lists "[t]he economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant" first among the factors relevant
to determining whether a taking has occurred." If the economic
impact on a landowner's land is relevant to the takings inquiry,
the challenge is necessarily an "as applied" challenge subject to
92. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2086. For commentary suggesting that the Court had mistakenly
transplanted a substantive due process concept into the law of takings, see Thomas E.
Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW.
L. REv. 623, 640-41 (2002).
93. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court explained these conclusions by noting that "the
'substantially advances' inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the
burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any
information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners." Id. As
a result, a landowner who contends that a regulation fails to substantially advance legitimate
governmental interests is limited to a substantive due process challenge. Id. at 2082-85.
94. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
95. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331, 342 (2002) (noting that, unless there has been a total taking of the entire parcel,
"Penn Central was the proper framework" for takings analysis, and concluding that with
respect to moratorium the "interest in 'fairness and justice' [would] be best served by relying
on the familiar Penn Central approach); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001)
(remanding "for further consideration of the claim under the principles set forth in Penn
Central").
96. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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Williamson County's ripeness requirements. The Court, however,
has identified several circumstances in which the economic impact
of the government's action on a landowner's land is-at least
formally-irrelevant to the merits of a landowner's takings claim.
In these circumstances, the Court has developed per se categorical
rules that require the government to compensate the affected
landowner, however trivial the economic impact of the government's
action.97 First, if the government's action constitutes a "permanent
physical occupation" of the landowner's land, the government has
effected a taking and must pay compensation, no matter how little
financial damage the taking actually causes.9" Second, if the
government's action denies the landowner all economic use of its
land, the landowner is entitled to compensation regardless of the
initial value of its land.99 Third, if the government conditions
development approval on the landowner's conveyance of property,
the government's action amounts to a taking whenever an inade-
quate nexus exists between the condition and the reasons that
entitle the government to require approval.0 °
When a landowner advances a takings challenge in each of these
circumstances, the challenge is, in one sense, a "facial" challenge to
the government's action: the success of the challenge does not
depend on the economic impact visited on the particular landowner.
To the extent these challenges are "facial," are they subject to
Williamson County's ripeness requirements?
Such challenges should not be subject to the first of Williamson
County's ripeness requirements-that "the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue."''1 In articulating that requirement, the Court,
in Williamson County itself, emphasized the importance of the
97. For recent discussion of these per se rules, see, for example, Mark Fenster, Takings
Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 609, 617-21 (2004); Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories
of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 231, 239-44 (2004).
98. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
99. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
100. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
101. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
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challenged action's economic impact and the "extent to which it
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations."1 ' The
Court went on to conclude that "[tihose factors simply cannot be
evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at
issue to the particular land in question."'0 3 In cases where the
landowner's takings challenge can succeed even if the government
demonstrates that the economic effect on the landowner will be
minimal, the Court's articulated reason for the first ripeness
requirement is simply absent.104
The Court's second ripeness requirement-that landowners seek
compensation through the procedures provided by the state-raises
more significant issues. For a period following Williamson County,
it appeared as if the federal courts would hold that these "facial"
challenges, or at least those based on alleged "physical takings,"
were exempt from the obligation to seek compensation through state
procedures. 05 More recently, however, federal courts have generally
held that physical takings are subject to Williamson County's second
ripeness requirement."6 Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. City
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id.
104. For this reason, a number of courts have held that the ripeness requirement does not
apply to physical takings cases. See, e.g., McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317
(8th Cir. 1997) ("A physical taking is by definition a final decision for the purpose of satisfying
Williamson's first requirement."); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d
1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1989)("A physical taking, such as the one at issue here, is by definition
a final decision, and thereby satisfies Williamson County's first exhaustion requirement.").
105. In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit
reached the merits of a challenge to a rent control ordinance. The court treated the case as
a physical invasion case, and Judge Kozinski rejected the municipality's ripeness challenge,
noting that Williamson County was a regulatory taking case, not a physical invasion case. Id.
at 1281 n.28. The opinion failed to distinguish between Williamson County's two ripeness
requirements. See id.; see also Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 92-100 (2d
Cir. 1992) (evaluating, and rejecting, the merits of a physical takings challenge, and then
rejecting, on ripeness grounds, a regulatory takings challenge to the same action).
106. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 91-92 (1st Cir. 2003)
(subjecting physical takings claim to second ripeness requirement); Daniel v. County of Santa
Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d
313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 380 (2d
Cir. 1995) (subjecting physical takings claim and Nollan exaction claim to second ripeness
requirement, and emphasizing that Southview Associates did not reach the issue).
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of Los Angeles 7 contains the earliest and most extensive justifica-
tion for this position:
The question we face here is whether the zoning ordinance
effect[s] an unconstitutional, uncompensated taking. To make
this determination, we must first decide whether compensation
is available. If such be the case, it would be "unnecessary" to
resolve the taking claims for "[wihere the action ... is a taking...
the availability of a suit for compensation ... will defeat a
contention that the action is unconstitutional as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment."1"8
Judge Nelson's treatment of the issue in Southern Pacific is
certainly consistent with-although perhaps not compelled by-the
Supreme Court's language in subsequent cases, but the Court has
never addressed the issue directly. Whether takings challenges that
rest on the Court's per se rules satisfy the Williamson County
ripeness requirements should ultimately be determined by reference
to the purposes of those requirements-an issue that serves as the
focus of Part III.
B. "As Applied" Challenges
Most takings challenges are "as applied" challenges-challenges
that focus, at least in part, on the impact of a government regulation
on the value of landowner's parcel. If a landowner were to contend
in state court that the regulation constitutes a taking in violation of
the Federal Constitution, a state court determination sustaining the
regulation would clearly preclude relitigation of the takings issue in
federal court. But suppose the landowner does not advance a federal
takings challenge, instead contending only that the regulation
violates the state constitution's takings clause or some other
statutory or constitutional proscription. What impact does an
adverse state court determination have on the landowner's subse-
quent right to advance a takings challenge in federal court?
107. 922 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. Id. at 506 (second alteration in original; citation and emphasis omitted).
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1. The Impact of State Preclusion Law
The federal full faith and credit statute provides that state acts,
records, and judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State."'" The statute's language
dictates that the preclusive effect of a state court judgment is to be
determined by the 'law or usage" of the rendering state, at least in
the absence of some other federal statute that might qualify the
impact of § 1738.1
In a series of cases decided over the last twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court has construed § 1738 broadly, holding that state
court determinations can have both issue and claim preclusive effect
on subsequent federal claims in federal courts-even as to issues on
which the federal courts have exclusive federal jurisdiction. The
Court first held, in Allen v. McCurry, that a state criminal court
determination that police officers had not violated a defendant's
constitutional rights would preclude the erstwhile defendant from
maintaining a federal § 1983 claim for violation of those same
constitutional rights."' Allen itself involved issue preclusion, but
in a series of subsequent cases, the Court held that a state court's
disposition of a state claim-if state preclusion rules so provided--
could prevent a plaintiff from maintaining a federal statutory claim
in federal court."' Thus, in Migra v. Warren City School District
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The statute implements the Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which provides that
[flull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Thus, the Constitution gave Congress some power to prescribe the
effect of state judgments, and Congress, by statute, acted to require that those judgments be
given the effect they have by law or usage in the state where rendered.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
111. 449 U.S. 90, 91, 105 (1980).
112. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982), the Court held
that a state court determination that an employee's discharge was not based on national
origin or religion precluded the employee from litigating the same issue in a federal action
premised on Title VII. Two years later, in Migra v. Warren City School District Board of
Education, 465 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1984), the Court established that a state court proceeding
could preclude a federal claim as well as litigation of a federal issue. For general discussion,
see Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289 (1993) (approving the
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Board of Education,113 the Court held that a state court determina-
tion in a breach of contract action brought by a school district
employee could preclude the employee from bringing a federal
action under § 1983-even though the employee never raised § 1983
claims in state court-because the employee could have raised the
claims with the state contract action in the original state court
proceeding.114 Indeed, the Court applied these principles to hold that
a state proceeding can bar a federal securities claim or a federal
antitrust claim even if the claim was never litigated in state court." 5
Taken together, these cases leave little room for federal preclu-
sion doctrine. The impact of a state determination on a subsequent
federal claim is to be determined by state preclusion law." 6
2. Takings Claims and Issue Preclusion
The Supreme Court's opinion in San Remo did not expressly
determine whether the hotel's effort to litigate its federal takings
claim in federal court was foreclosed by the doctrine of claim
preclusion or by the doctrine of issue preclusion."' Instead, the
Court assumed that the Ninth Circuit was correct in determining
that California issue preclusion doctrine barred the federal takings
Court's strict interpretation of the full faith and credit statute).
113. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
114. Id. at 83-84. The Court remanded to determine whether Ohio preclusion doctrine, in
fact, would have precluded a subsequent § 1983 action. Id. at 87.
115. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380 (1996) (finding that a
settlement agreement approved by a state court precludes a subsequent securities act claim
within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (holding that a state judgment precludes a federal
antitrust claim, even though the antitrust claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts). For concerns about the impact of Matsushita on class actions litigation, see
Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond The Role of State Courts in Class
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 219.
116. For criticism of this result in cases where state preclusion law might be hostile to or
inconsistent with federal rights, see Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and
Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 639 (1985)
(concluding that the Court's approach in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and Migra, "is
almost surely wrong"); Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and
Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 813, 830-31
(1986) (arguing that state preclusion law should have no effect on federal § 1983 actions).
117. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2500 n.14
(2005) ("Our limited review in this case does not include the question whether the Court of
Appeals' reading of California preclusion law was in error.").
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claim because the issues determined by the state court in rejecting
the state takings claim were the same issues that would be
determinative of the federal claim.118 The Court's concern, then, was
with a limited issue: are federal takings claims exempt from the
mandate of§ 1738? 1" To that question, the Court's emphatic answer
was no.
120
Consider, then, the question the Court did not decide: what
impact does issue preclusion doctrine have on federal takings
claims? In most jurisdictions, issue preclusion doctrine applies to
three types of determinations: determinations of evidentiary fact,
determinations of law, and determinations of "ultimate fact." 1
Examine first a determination of evidentiary fact---did the
commission require payment of a $567,000 fee as a condition for
granting a permit? Of course such a determination can be critical
to the shape of a federal takings claim, and holding state determi-
nations of evidentiary fact preclusive in federal proceedings will
often narrow the issues left to be resolved in a federal takings
challenge. 122 But, according issue-preclusive effect to state court
determinations of evidentiary fact will not typically bar a landowner
from advancing a federal takings claim in federal court; instead, the
state court determination will serve principally to crystallize the
issues in the federal adjudication. 123
Similarly, according issue-preclusive effect to a state court
determination of law-the commission's action does not violate the
California Constitution's takings clause--will not generally prevent
118. Id. at 2501 n.18.
119. Id. at 2495.
120. Id. at 2507.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1980). For a brief discussion
of the historical development of modern issue preclusion doctrine from earlier principles of
"estoppel by record," see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal
System's Interest, 70 IowA L. REv. 81, 89-90 (1984). Professor Hazard notes that the First
Restatement of Judgments did not apply issue preclusion principles to issues of law. Id.
122. Cf. England v. La. State Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,416 (1964) ("How the facts
are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims.").
123. Moreover, a state court determination on an issue of evidentiary fact will generally
have no binding effect in a subsequent federal court proceeding unless the determination was
essential to the judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1980).
Thus, if a state court were to determine that the commission required payment of a fee, but
that the fee was not essential to adjudication of the state law claim, the determination would
have no preclusive effect in federal court.
20061 273
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a landowner from mounting a federal takings challenge in federal
court. The legal issue in the federal proceeding-the meaning of the
federal constitutional provision-was neither actually litigated nor
essential to the state court judgment, so long as the state court
limited itself to construction of the California Constitution. 124 The
same will be true whenever the landowner plaintiff limits itself to
a state constitutional challenge and the state court limits itself to
deciding whether the municipality's action was consistent with the
state constitution.
Issue preclusion presents the greatest threat to federal takings
claims when the state court has made a determination of ultimate
fact, for instance, a determination that the fee imposed on the
hotel's owner was reasonably related to the number of units
designated for conversion. When a determination of ultimate fact is
critical-as it was in San Remo-for both the state and the federal
takings claim, issue preclusion doctrine could require, as the Ninth
Circuit concluded in San Remo, outright dismissal of the federal
takings claim.
State court determinations of ultimate fact are most likely to be
issue preclusive in federal proceedings in cases like San Remo, when
the elements of the state takings claim appear identical to the
elements of the federal takings claim. In such cases, a state court
finding that the landowner has failed to establish one of the
elements necessary to support a state takings claim would also
establish that the parallel element is missing from a federal takings
claim that the landowner would later choose to advance. But those
are the very cases in which issue preclusion is most likely to be
superfluous, because claim preclusion principles will bar federal
litigation of the federal takings claim. 125 On most theories of claim
124. In most jurisdictions, issue preclusion applies only when the issue in question has
actually been litigated and determined in the first proceeding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). The California courts, however, appear to have relaxed the actual
litigation requirement to compensate for the unusually narrow scope of California claim
preclusion doctrine. See generally Walter W. Heiser, California's Confusing Collateral
Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 509, 535-46 (1998) [hereinafter
Confusing Collateral Estoppel] (discussing California cases).
125. In San Remo itself, the city never argued that claim preclusion principles were
applicable, apparently out of fear that the hotel owners' "England reservation" would bar
application of the claim preclusion doctrine. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City &
County, 364 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004). As the next Part demonstrates, that fear should
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preclusion, if two claims require proof of the identical elements,
judgment with respect to the first claim will generally be conclusive
with respect to the second.'
In many states, however, state takings doctrine is a messy
amalgam of principles articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court and
doctrines indigenous to the particular state. 12 7 Litigants, other than
those seeking to preserve a federal forum, typically advance federal
and state constitutional claims in the same proceeding, and judicial
opinions do not neatly segregate state and federal claims.'28 But
takings claims are often rejected on grounds not articulated in
Supreme Court opinions. In New York, for instance, courts hold that
a landowner is barred from challenging a restriction that was in
place when the landowner purchased the affected parcel.'29 The New
have been unfounded.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. b (1980) ('Though no single
factor is determinative, the relevance of trial convenience makes it appropriate to ask how far
the witnesses or proofs in the second action would tend to overlap the witnesses or proofs
relevant to the first. If there is a substantial overlap, the second action should ordinarily be
held precluded.'). Peculiarities of California's claim preclusion doctrine, however, might have
prevented application of the doctrine. Professor Heiser has noted that California adheres to
a "primary rights" theory of claim preclusion, under which
a single wrongful act which violates two primary rights gives rise to two causes
of action. Moreover, where a plaintiff has more than one cause of action against
a defendant, the plaintiff may join them in one lawsuit but is not required to do
so either by the rules of joinder or res judicata.
Walter W. Heiser, California's Unpredictable Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Doctrine, 35
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 559, 566-67 (1998) [hereinafter Unpredictable Res Judicata] (emphasis
omitted). Professor Heiser has also argued that California's narrow claim preclusion doctrine
has led to distortions of California issue preclusion doctrine, so that California courts
sometimes hold that issue preclusion applies to issues that the parties could have litigated,
but did not litigate, in an earlier proceeding. Confusing Collateral Estoppel, supra note 124,
at 541-42.
127. See, e.g., R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 2001)
(finding that Alaska's constitutional prohibition on takings is broader than the prohibition of
the Federal Constitution, articulating factors derived from an Alaska case, and then
concluding that the action constituted an unconstitutional taking without identifying whether
the conclusion was based on the federal as well as the state constitution).
128. See, e.g., id.; K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 539-40
(Mich. 1998) (finding a taking after discussing state and federal constitutional provisions and
relying on both state and federal cases). The opinion never indicated which constitutional
provision had been violated.
129. Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997); see also Planned
Investors Corp. v. Village of Massapequa Park, No. 405/02, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 17-32
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2004) (applying Anello standard after U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001), in which the Court suggested that
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Jersey Supreme Court, though holding that state and federal
constitutional protections are coextensive, has also held that no
taking can occur, and no financial compensation is available, when
a challenged ordinance is held invalid because its application to a
landowner's parcel is arbitrary.'
If a state court were to reject a state takings claim by relying at
least in part on doctrines like these, no determination of ultimate
fact made by the state court would have issue-preclusive effect in a
subsequent takings challenge brought in federal court, because no
such determination would have been "essential" to the state court
judgment. 3 ' The more the state takings doctrine diverges from
federal takings doctrine, the smaller the possibility that issue
preclusion principles will foreclose federal litigation of federal
takings claims.
3. Takings Claims and Claim Preclusion
The Court's focus in San Remo was on the identity of issues
raised in the state and federal proceedings.'32 And the Ninth Circuit
explicitly relied on issue preclusion to bar the hotel's federal takings
claim."3 As the preceding Part demonstrates, however, issue
preclusion doctrine will often be inadequate to close the doors of the
federal courts to federal takings claims. By contrast, claim preclu-
sion, combined with the Williamson County ripeness requirements,
provides a nearly insurmountable obstacle for claimants seeking
acquisition of title with notice of regulation cannot serve as an absolute bar to takings
challenges).
130. Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 777 A.2d 334, 343 (N.J. 2001).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1980) ("Ifa judgment of a court
of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing
independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with
respect to either issue standing alone.").
132. Thus, the Court noted that "[a]s in Allen, we are presently concerned only with issues
actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of federal claims raised under § 1983."
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (2005). The
Court also emphasized that "[b]y broadening their state action ... to include their
'substantially advances' claims, petitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the
same federal issues they asked it to reserve." Id. at 2503.
133. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364 F.3d 1088, 1094-99 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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federal court litigation of federal takings claims, and effectively
insures that takings litigation will be localized in the state courts.
In San Remo itself, the city did not contend that claim preclusion
doctrine prevented the hotel from litigating its "as applied" chal-
lenges in federal court. Apparently, the city had assumed-not
unreasonably in light of existing practice-that the hotel owners'
"England reservation" prevented application of claim preclusion
doctrine." 4 The Supreme Court's opinion in San Remo undermines
the foundation for that assumption.
Analysis of the claim-preclusion issue, like analysis of issue
preclusion, begins with the federal full faith and credit statute. 135
On its face, the statute mandates deference to state preclusion law.
If a state judgment rejecting a state takings claim does not preclude
a subsequent federal takings claim, the failure to preclude must be
rooted either in some federal exception to the statutory mandate or
in the substance of state preclusion law.
136
Consider first potential exceptions arising from federal law. In
San Remo, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed a principle it has
consistently applied in a series of cases decided since 1980: excep-
tions to the § 1738 statutory mandate must be reflected in a
subsequent federal statute.1 37 The existence of a federal ques-
tion-even the statutory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over
particular claims-does not overcome the § 1738 requirement that
federal courts defer to state claim preclusion principles. 138
134. Id. at 1094. Another possibility is that the city had assumed that California's peculiar
"primary rights" theory of claim preclusion made the doctrine inapplicable. See generally
Unpredictable Res Judicata, supra note 126 (discussing claim preclusion as the "primary
aspect" of California's doctrine of res judicata).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). As the Supreme Court has emphasized in other contexts,
whatever policy concerns underlie preserving federal court review do not "justify a distinction
between the issue preclusive and claim preclusive effects of state-court judgments." Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984). See generally Gene R. Shreve,
Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1249 (1986) ("Plaintiff Migra
weakened her position when she opted to begin by litigating in state court.").
136. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) (developing
a two-part analytical framework: if state law indicates that a claim or issue would be
precluded, a federal court must decide whether an exception to the mandate of § 1738 exists).
137. See Shreve, supra note 135, at 1220, 1224-25.
138. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996); Marrese, 470 U.S.
at 380. See generally Shreve, supra note 135, at 1245-47 (explaining the reasoning for state
claim preclusion principles).
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As a result, the only plausible federal basis for avoiding state
claim preclusion rules is the Court's opinion in England. In
England, the Court held that when application of federal abstention
doctrine remits a federal plaintiff to state court for resolution of
state claims, the federal plaintiff can reserve its right to litigate
federal claims in federal court.139 The Court's language focused on
a plaintiffs right to litigate federal claims in a federal forum
-language that sounds quaint in light of the Court's subsequent
jurisprudence. 140
Justice Brennan's opinion was written in 1964 in the heyday of
the Supreme Court's post-Erie infatuation with federal common
law.'4 ' The only statutory foundation the Court offered for its
holding was the general grant of federal jurisdiction to adjudicate
federal constitutional claims.'42 And, as we have seen, the Court
has not in recent years regarded that grant as sufficient to
overcome the mandate of § 1738.143 But in the context of Pullman
139. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964).
140. Thus, in Allen v. McCurry, the Court found it "difficult to discern" authority for the
"principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered
opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court." 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980). In
McCurry, the § 1983 plaintiff had been a defendant in a state criminal proceeding, and the
holding in the state proceeding nevertheless had preclusive effect on the § 1983 claim. Id. at
91, 104.
141. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Indeed, 1964 brought the publication
of Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964), in many ways the high-water mark for federal common law. For an account
of the rise-and subsequent fall-of the New Federal Common Law, see John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 136-46 (1998).
142. In rejecting the conclusion that a person with federal constitutional claims could be
required to accept state court adjudication of those claims, Justice Brennan wrote only that
[s]uch a result would be at war with the unqualified terms in which Congress,
pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific categories of
jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and with the principle that "When a Federal
court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it
is its duty to take such jurisdiction .... The right of a party plaintiff to choose a
Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied."
England, 375 U.S. at 415 (quoting Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)). The
opinion provided no other statutory authority for its conclusion. Compare that language with
Justice Thomas's opinion in Matsushita: "Absent a partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, by another federal statute, a federal court must give the judgment the
same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered." 516 U.S.
at 369.
143. Indeed, the Court has not even regarded a specific and explicit grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction as sufficient to supplant the mandate of § 1738. See, e.g., Matsushita, 516
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abstention,144 the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction carries more
force: here, the conflict is not merely between the statutory grant of
federal jurisdiction and the command of § 1738, but rather between
the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction and the judge-made
abstention doctrine.145 If federal courts never invoked the abstention
doctrine with respect to claims properly brought in federal court,
state courts would have no opportunity to render judgments with a
preclusive effect on those federal claims, and § 1738 would not come
into play. Thus, absent a procedure like the one articulated by the
Court in England, a federal court's decision to abstain-which rests
only on judge-made doctrine-would effectively prevent a litigant
who has properly invoked federal statutory jurisdiction from
obtaining federal judicial review of federal claims. 4 ' England
reservations, therefore, may be necessary to justify federal absten-
tion doctrine.'47
In light of this problem, the Court in San Remo not surprisingly
declined to overrule England, but instead limited its application to
the abstention context. The Court indicated that when a federal
court abstains from deciding a landowner's "facial" takings claim, a
claim ripe when first advanced in federal court, an England reser-
U.S. at 381 (providing that the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal securities
claims is not sufficient to work partial repeal of § 1738).
144. The traditional justification for the doctrine focuses on the preference for having state
rather than federal courts decide state law questions, largely because state courts are thought
to be better equipped to decide state law issues. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 499-500 (1941). Barry Friedman has offered an alternative explanation for Pullman
abstention: it enables federal courts to avoid deciding difficult federal issues that the federal
courts prefer to avoid. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 530, 577-80 (1989).
145. For the argument that Pullman abstention constitutes impermissible overruling of
congressional statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, see Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71
(1984).
146. A parallel problem arises when federal courts abstain, in diversity cases, to avoid
deciding critical questions of state law or to avoid interference with a complex state regulatory
scheme. See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943). In these cases, federal abstention prevents federal
judicial review of claims over which the federal courts have diversity jurisdiction. Presumably,
England reservations are not available in these cases because there are typically no federal
claims to review.
147. Professor Shreve, though arguing that England was wrongly decided, nevertheless
conceded that "[ilt is probably true that the dispensation England grants from section 1738
is necessary for the Pullman doctrine to work as intended." Shreve, supra note 135, at 1250.
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vation could appropriately preserve federal claims for subsequent
federal court review. 148 By contrast, landowners' "as applied" takings
claims are not ripe until after state court adjudication. As a result,
they are not properly in federal court, not properly subject to
abstention doctrine, and not properly subject to England reserva-
tions.
149
Nothing in the Court's analytical framework distinguishes issue
preclusion from claim preclusion. Section 1738 applies equally to
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 5 ° When a federal court
properly invokes the abstention doctrine, a state court judgment
rendered after an England reservation will have neither issue
preclusive effect nor claim preclusive effect in a subsequent federal
adjudication of federal claims. But when the federal claim is not
ripe, and no ground for abstention exists, England reservations are
not authorized and can operate to trump neither state issue
preclusion doctrine nor state claim preclusion doctrine.
Consider next the impact of state preclusion doctrine on federal
takings claims. Suppose a landowner proceeds in state court, and
advances only state constitutional and statutory challenges to a
land use regulation. Suppose further that the state court decides
only state issues, and does not reach out to decide federal issues not
raised by the parties. If the landowner now proceeds to federal
court, does the state claim preclusion doctrine bar the landowner's
federal takings claim?
148. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491,2503 (2005).
149. Id.
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
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In general, the answer is yes' 51-unless the state court would
permit a landowner-plaintiff to bring two separate actions in
state court: one challenging the regulation as a violation of state
statutory and constitutional law, and a second challenging the
regulation as a violation of the federal Takings Clause. Although an
occasional state court might permit a litigant to advance separate
challenges,'52  that position would invite the very "piecemeal
litigation" modern claim preclusion law is designed to avoid.'53
Permitting a litigant tdi split federal and state takings claims would
impose needless burdens on the state courts, with no commensurate
gain. 1
54
151. Section 24 of the Second Restatement of Judgments takes a "transactional" view of
claim preclusion rather than one that focuses on the identify of the legal theory advanced in
the two proceedings. The Restatement reflects the current trend "to see claim in factual terms
and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive
theories ... that may be available to the plaintiff." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
24 cmt. a. The drafters noted, and rejected, an older view under which the plaintiff, "defeated
in an action based on one theory, might be able to maintain another action based on a
different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the defendant's identical act
or connected acts forming a single life-situation." Id. To make the point more explicit,
comment c provides "[tihat a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor
may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple
claims." For application of the transactional approach in the takings context, see Guetersloh
v. State, 930 S.W.2d 284, 290 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding a federal takings claim barred in state
court by prior litigation of a state claim).
Howard Erichson has noted that some states have adhered to a somewhat narrower view
of claim preclusion, focusing on "whether the 'same evidence' would suffice to prove [both]
claims," or on "whether the same 'primary rights' are involved." Howard M. Erichson,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 974 (1998). Even on those linguistic
formulations, determining a state takings claim would operate to preclude a federal takings
claim.
152. Cf. Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 612 N.W.2d 44,49-50 (Wis. 2000) (answering a question
certified by the Seventh Circuit, and holding that a landowner who had previously challenged
denial of a permit pursuant to Wisconsin's certiorari procedures would not be barred from
subsequently bringing a § 1983 action alleging that the permit denial violated his equal
protection rights). The court emphasized that monetary relief was not available in certiorari
proceedings. Id.
153. Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Mycogen Corp. v.
Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 302 (Cal. 2002) (noting that a stable "res judicata doctrine
promotes judicial economy"); Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Mass. 1990) (discussing
the public policy considerations underlying claim preclusion).
154. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e ("A given claim may find
support in theories or grounds arising from both state and federal law. When the plaintiff
brings an action on the claim in a court, either state or federal, in which there is no
jurisdictional obstacle to his advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of
them, and judgment is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second action in
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Concerns about judicial economy, then, will inevitably induce
most state courts to prohibit the splitting of federal and state
takings claims between two separate state court proceedings. A
judgment rejecting a state takings claim will have a claim-preclu-
sive effect with respect to a subsequent federal takings claim
brought in state court. But suppose a state court were to determine
that, although a state court determination on a state takings claim
precludes further action in state court, the isame judgment should
not preclude a subsequent adjudication ofa federal takings claim
in federal court. That is, suppose a state court were to authorize a
state-authorized version of the England reservation procedure. 5 '
Would that procedure remove the claim. preclusion obstacle facing
a landowner who seeks to litigate its federal takings claim in federal
court?
The clear answer is no. First, the full faith and credit statute
itself requires both state and federal courts to give judgments the
"same full faith and credit ... as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which they are
taken. 156 That is, the effect of a state judgment is to be measured
by the effect that judgment has "in the courts of such State"; if the
judgment is preclusive in the courts of state X, it is to be preclusive
everywhere.' Second, the Supreme Court has made crystal clear,
in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., that a state court may not
provide that one of its judgments should have less effect in other
courts than it has in the court where the judgment is rendered.158
Thomas itself involved the effect of a judgment in sister-state courts,
not in federal courts;15 9 but because the same statute governs in
each circumstance, the same analysis applies. In Thomas, the Court
repudiated its prior holding that a state court's statements about
which he tenders the other theory or ground.").
155. In Guetersloh v. State, 930 S.W.2d at 290, a Texas court appeared to authorize a
reservation of federal law claims, although the authorization appeared to reflect the belief
that England compelled that result. Theoretically, a state court might authorize such a
procedure to avoid the need to resolve federal takings claims.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
157. See generally Lilly, supra note 112, at 300-01 (commenting that case law "provide[s]
impressive support for the proposition that [any court within the United States] is closely
bound by [a state court's] rules of claim and issue preclusion").
158. 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980) (plurality opinion).
159. Id. at 263-64.
282 [Vol. 48:251
THE DEMISE OF FEDERAL TAKINGS LITIGATION
the extraterritorial effect of its judgments were determinative for
full faith and credit purposes: "[B]y virtue of the full faith and credit
obligations of the several States, a State is permitted to determine
the extraterritorial effect of its judgments, but it may only do so
indirectly, by prescribing the effect of its judgments within the
State."' ° A federal policy mandating a uniform effect of judgments
across the country, as expressed in the mandate of the full faith and
credit statute, prevents an individual state court from prescribing
differential effects for itl judgments in its own courts and elsewhere.
As a result, if a state judgment precludes a subsequent federal
takings claim in state court, the same judgment precludes a federal
takings claim in federal court.
Claim preclusion, then, operates effectively to eliminate "as
applied" takings challenges from the federal courts. The Williamson
County state-litigation requirement requires plaintiffs to seek
compensation in state court in order to "ripen" any federal takings
claim. San Remo establishes, however, that no federal law autho-
rizes the bifurcation of state and federal takings claims. Hence, if
state preclusion doctrine would require a takings plaintiff to join
federal takings claims with any request for compensation, that
preclusion doctrine would bind the federal courts. And, as this Part
has demonstrated, claim preclusion rules applicable in state court
are virtually certain to prevent a landowner from splitting state
takings claims from federal takings claims. The question, then, is
whether this system makes sense-a question Chief Justice
Rehnquist raised in his San Remo concurrence with his suggestion
that the Court rethink the ripeness doctrine developed in William-
son County.
160. Id. at 270. The Court continued:
The McCartin rule, however, focusing as it does on the extraterritorial intent
of the rendering State, is fundamentally different. It authorizes a State, by
drafting or construing its legislation in "unmistakable language," directly to
determine the extraterritorial effect of its workmen's compensation awards....
It follows inescapably that the McCartin "unmistakable language" rule
represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this Court's responsibility
for the final arbitration of full faith and credit questions.
Id. at 270-71 (citations omitted).
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III. RETHINKING WILLIAMSON COUNTY
A. The Court's Justification and the Rehnquist Critique
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Williamson County articulates not
one, but two ripeness hurdles that confront a landowner seeking to
litigate a takings claim in federal court. The first hurdle-the
government entity charged with implementing the regulation must
have reached a final decision regarding application of the regula-
tion-has not generated significant controversy.' 6 ' As the Court's
opinion observed, evaluating the economic impact of the regulation
or its effect on reasonable, investment-backed expectations is
impossible until the agency has decided how to apply the regulation
to the land in question. 6 ' Moreover, this first ripeness requirement,
by itself, would not bar takings claims from federal court; if this
were the only applicable ripeness hurdle, once the landowner
received a final determination from the relevant administrative
agency, it could choose to advance the takings claim either in
federal or state court.
By contrast, the second Williamson County ripeness hurdle-that
the landowner must seek compensation through available state
procedures-does essentially bar takings claims from federal court,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his San Remo concurrence, ques-
tioned the merit of this hurdle.6 ' The Williamson County opinion
itself justified this second requirement primarily in formal
terms-because the Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking
of property except without just compensation, a landowner has no
claim against the government if it takes property, but provides an
adequate process for obtaining compensation.'64 In San Remo,
161. Commentators who express outrage at the second ripeness hurdle, requiring
landowners to seek relief through state procedures, offer little or no criticism of the finality
requirement. See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 13, at 240 (criticizing federal courts' tendency to
use claim preclusion and issue preclusion to create a permanent bar to federal jurisdiction
rather than the intended procedural delay).
162. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191
(1985).
163. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2508
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
164. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95.
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Justice Stevens's majority opinion added a prudential justification
for limiting the right of plaintiffs to press takings claims in federal
courts: "[S]tate courts undoubtedly have more experience than
federal courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and
legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations."165
These justifications did not persuade Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurring for himself and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Thomas. The Chief Justice wrote that "[iut is not obvious that either
constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize
all state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal
takings claim. 166 He questioned the argument that state court fam-
iliarity with local land use and zoning regulations makes relegating
takings claims to state court proper, noting that the familiarity
argument would apply with equal force to First Amendment
challenges to zoning regulations-challenges routinely heard by
federal courts.6 7 Further, though agreeing that the "state courts are
competent to enforce federal rights and to adjudicate federal takings
claims," the Chief Justice noted that state courts are equally
competent to adjudicate other federal claims. 68 The competence of
state courts did not, in his view, "explain why federal takings claims
in particular should be singled out to be confined to state court."'69
The Chief Justice did not argue that Williamson County's second
ripeness requirement should be abandoned. He argued instead-
quite accurately-that the affirmative case for the requirement had
not been made. 7 ° Because Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor were among the four concurring Justices, recent changes
in the Court's composition ' are unlikely to generate a fifth vote for
165. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507.
166. Id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
167. Id. at 2509.
168. Id.
169. Id. Much of the Chief Justice's concurrence was devoted to distinguishing the state
litigation requirement from the principle of comity that bars taxpayers from challenging the
validity of state tax systems in federal court. The majority had cited Fair Assessment in Real
EstateAss'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), for the proposition that the Court has limited the
ability of plaintiffs to press federal claims in federal courts in other areas. San Remo, 125 S.
Ct. at 2507. The majority's citation of McNary, however, was not central to the opinion, and
appeared almost as if it were written in response to the Chief Justice's claim that federal
takings claims had been singled out for resolution in state court.
170. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("In short, the affirmative
case for the state-litigation requirement has yet to be made.").
171. In 2005 John Roberts replaced William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, and in 2006
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rethinking the state-litigation requirement. But the Chief Justice's
call for reconsideration deserves a response. The next two Parts
focus on two points. First, because takings jurisprudence depends
so heavily on state property law, the Supreme Court has effec-
tively-if implicitly-delegated development of takings doctrine to
the state courts. Second, Williamson County's state-litigation
requirement is critical to a structure in which state courts bear
primary responsibility for policing land use regulations.
rr
B. The Structure of the Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence
As Justice Stevens noted in San Remo, almost all of the Supreme
Court's takings cases have reached the Court from state supreme
courts.172 That result has been inevitable since Williamson County,
but the pattern was the same even before articulation of the
Williamson County ripeness requirements.
In deciding those cases, the Court has developed a set of
categorical rules for resolving takings controversies. The govern-
ment may not take action that results in a permanent physical
occupation without paying compensation to the affected land-
owner. 173 Regulation constitutes a taking if it denies the landowner
all beneficial use of the land (unless the regulation replicates
preexisting nuisance law).174 The government may not condition
development on an exaction from the landowner unless the exaction
is related to, and roughly proportional to, the circumstances that
entitle the municipality to require approvals in the first place. 175 A
state may not bar a federal takings claim solely on the ground that
the affected landowner purchased with knowledge of the challenged
Samuel Alito replaced Sandra O'Connor as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
172. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2506.
173. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
174. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
175. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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regulation.176 Remedies for a taking must include money damages,
and may not be limited to declaratory relief.177
For the vast bulk of takings cases that do not fall within the scope
of one of these categorical rules, the Court has applied what has
come to be called the Penn Central balancing test. 7 In fact,
however, that "test" is devoid of balancing: when the Court decides
the Penn Central test is applicable to a state or local regulation, the
landowner always loses. The only cases in which the Court has
applied the Penn Central test to invalidate the government regula-
tion have been cases of federal government action.'79
The effect, if not the expressed intent, of the Court's Penn Central
jurisprudence has been to delegate resolution of takings claims to
the state supreme courts. Penn Central leaves the state legislatures
and state courts free to develop more stringent takings rules than
those articulated by the Court. The state courts are of course free to
construe takings clauses in state constitutions more broadly than
the Supreme Court's construction of the federal provision."s
Moreover, if a state supreme court were to apply the Penn Central
balancing test to strike down a state or municipal regulation as a
taking in violation of the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court
would almost certainly not review that determination; the determi-
176. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) ("A blanket rule that purchasers
with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument
to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken."). Portions of Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Palazzolo appeared to support a broader categorical rule that the
purchasers' knowledge of the restriction is not relevant to a takings claim. Id. at 627 ("The
State's rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of property, as the newly regulated
landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the
regulation. The State may not by this means secure a windfall for itself."); see also id. at 637
(Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the idea that the preexistence of a regulation should factor
in the takings analysis). One member of the five-Justice majority was not, however, willing
to go so far. See id. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of LA., 482 U.S. 304, 306-07
(1987).
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 317 & n.14 (2002)
(describing the "ad hoc balance approach" of Penn Central).
179. See E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987). See generally Sterk, supra note 15, at 251-56 (discussing the inevitability
of the result when the Court applies Penn Centrals balancing test).
180. For an example of a state court purporting to apply the takings clause of the state
constitution more broadly than the federal constitutional provision, see R & Y, Inc. v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 2001).
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nation would almost inevitably rest on an adequate state
ground-the state supreme court's construction of the state
constitution-thus insulating the decision from Supreme Court
review."'
Federalism concerns support this effective delegation of federal
takings jurisprudence to state supreme courts. The Takings Clause
does not guarantee any particular property rights; instead, it
protects against abrupt change in property, rights."'2 The baseline
against which any regulation is measured is a baseline derived from
state law: if background state law did not recognize or create
property in the first instance, then a subsequent state action cannot
take property.' 8 ' Evaluation of a takings claim, then, requires a
thorough grounding in background state law.
In this respect, the Takings Clause differs dramatically from the
Equal Protection Clause,'84 the First Amendment, or the vast
majority of other federal constitutional provisions. When a plaintiff
challenges a state action on equal protection or First Amendment
grounds, federal constitutional standards provide the benchmark
against which the state action is measured." State law plays little
181. See Ann Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARv. L. REv. 1485, 1491-92 (1987) (noting that when a state court strikes down a state
action on state constitutional grounds, the determination escapes Supreme Court review).
182. See Robert Brauneis, 'The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence"."
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 621-31 (1996) (attributing to Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal the
recognition that whether an enactment constitutes a taking depends on values owners enjoyed
before the enactment).
183. See Sterk, supra note 15, at 211-14 (discussing the way state law has affected takings
doctrine).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
185. For instance, when a state cross-burning statute is challenged on First Amendment
grounds, the constitutional issue is whether the statute bars speech whose "value as a step
to truth" is "outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343,358-59 (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382-83 (1992)). State
law plays no role in that inquiry. Similarly, when the Court evaluates an equal protection
claim, the analytical work focuses on classification of the parties and rights involved, not on
background state law. When claims are subject to rational basis review, the state statute
almost inevitably is upheld. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003)
(upholding a tax statute providing a lower tax rate for riverboat slot machines than for
racetrack slot machines). By contrast, when the claim involves a suspect class or a
fundamental right, strict scrutiny almost preordains that the statute will be invalidated. The
inquiry, however, is independent of state law. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374
(1885) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when Chinese businessmen
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or no role in determining the level of federal constitutional protec-
tion.
The unusual dependency of federal takings claims on state law
significantly affects the Supreme Court's role in developing takings
doctrine. In the more typical constitutional case, the Court's
opinions provide guidance to all courts-state and federal-through
a combination of hard-edged rules and more malleable standards or
balancing tests."8 6 Even when the Court's guidance comes in the
form of standards, those standards do not depend on the particular
state or federal law involved. Hence, the guidance is equally
valuable to courts across the country. By contrast, in takings cases
the guidance that crosses state boundaries is likely to be so general
as to be nearly useless. For instance, consider, among other factors,
"the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations."'8 7 The valuable guidance
comes not in identifying these broad general factors, but in explain-
ing how they apply to cases that arise against a distinct state law
background.
Consider an example of differences in state law property rights:
the rights of waterfront landowners. Oregon recognizes customary
rights in the public to cross the dry sand area between ordinary high
tide and the vegetation line. 8' New Hampshire, by contrast, rejects
customary rights altogether." 9 Against that background, suppose a
municipality in Oregon were to prohibit construction of any
structures within one hundred feet of the mean high-water mark. If
were denied business permits because of their race).
186. See generally Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1149, 1149-50 (1998) (emphasizing the Court's need to use its limited
resources to control or influence constitutional interpretation by others); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178-79 (1989) (emphasizing the
importance of clear Supreme Court rules). For a discussion of different sorts of balancing tests
as methods for implementing constitutional values, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 77-83
(1997).
187. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
188. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-77 (Or. 1969).
189. See Purdie v. Att'y Gen., 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999) (holding unconstitutional a
legislative effort to redefine a high-water mark); Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal
Beaches), 649 A.2d 604, 608, 611 (N.H. 1994) (holding that waterfront landowners own rights
to the high-water mark and that legislative efforts to create a recreational easement over that
land would require compensation).
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the Supreme Court were to reject a takings challenge to that
ordinance, the Court's opinion would provide little guidance with
respect to the constitutionality of an identical ordinance enacted by
a New Hampshire municipality, because the background property
law principles are so different.
Apart from the guidance they provide to state and federal
officials, including judges, Supreme Court opinions typically play
another critical role in the administration of our constitutional
system: they assure uniform enforcement ofeibnstitutional rights.190
Because all courts are subject to review by a-single Supreme Court
at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the prospect of Court review
serves a disciplinary function, deterring departure from the
framework developed by the Court. But this function, too, is of
limited value in the takings context, in which variation in the
content of background state law makes national uniformity
impossible.
To the extent that Supreme Court review is a scarce resource,
the Court would sensibly conserve that resource for cases that
generate more "bang for the buck" in terms both of guidance and
uniformity.191 In addition, however, Supreme Court adjudication of
takings cases has the potential to interfere with state primacy in
defining property rights. To determine whether a state's alteration
of property rights has gone "too far," the Court must ascertain
the context of state law both before and after enactment of the
challenged regulation. But it is the state supreme courts, not the
U.S. Supreme Court, whose judgments are supreme with respect to
each of those issues.
Moreover, although the constitutional takings claim is a weapon
in the arsenal of landowners seeking to discipline abusive behavior
by local regulators, it is hardly the only weapon. State courts
190. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994) (noting the importance
of affording similarly situated litigants equal treatment).
191. Although space on the Supreme Court's shrinking docket is a particularly scarce
resource, the federal courts as a whole have limited resources, prompting Professor Althouse
to sensibly suggest that federal judicial resources should be preserved for cases in which
federal court review would be most valuable. Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource,
44 VAND. L. REv. 953, 960-61 (1991). That insight suggests that many of the same reasons for
limiting Supreme Court intervention in takings cases apply to federal judicial intervention
more generally.
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frequently invalidate local land use regulations based on inadequate
statutory authority, 192 state preemption principles,19 or provisions
in state constitutions.'" In addition, state courts frequently
scrutinize local land use decisions to determine whether they are
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial evidence.195
These doctrinal limitations operate in conjunction with takings
claims to police local regulators. State courts are in the optimal
position to coordinate these various policing mechanisms. To the
extent the Supreme-Court views takings doctrine as a force for
policing regulators-and the Court's opinions frequently articulate
that vision of the Takings Clause -the Court is not in a position
192. See, e.g., Steinbergh v. Rent Control Bd., 546 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass. 1989)
(invalidating a restriction on sale of condominium units); Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v.
Lincoln Twp., 946 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (invalidating setback and bonding
requirements imposed to make it unfeasible for a landowner to operate-a hog farm on land
purchased for that purpose).
193. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals, 795 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a
state statute preempts local government freedom to impose variance standards that would
make a municipality's denial of variances easier); Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of
Camas, 49 P.3d 867 (Wash. 2002) (invalidating an open-space regulation as a tax on
development inconsistent with a state statute prohibiting municipalities from imposing taxes,
fees, or charges on land development).
194. The most prominent example outside of state takings claims came in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975), in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that each municipality had a constitutional
obligation to bear its fair share of the burden of providing low income housing.
195. Sometimes these decisions are explicitly rooted in constitutional due process concerns.
See, e.g., Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 722 N.E.2d 1018, 1023-24 (Ohio 2000) (invalidating
residential classification in an area dominated by retail space); In re Realen Valley Forge
Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 727-32 (Pa. 2003) (invalidating agricultural zoning
immediately adjacent to a large shopping complex). In other cases, the basis for invalidating
local decisions as arbitrary is less clear. See, e.g., Town of Florence v. Sea Lands, Ltd., 759
So.2d 1221, 1223 (Miss. 2000) (stating that zoning should be upheld unless "arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory, or is illegal, or without a substantial evidentiary basis") (quoting
Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So.2d 941,943 (Miss. 1991)); Turner v. Bd. of County Supervisors, 559
S.E.2d 683, 686 (Va. 2002) (holding zoning valid so long as "not unreasonable and arbitrary")
(quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (Va. 1959)).
196. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987) (expressing
concern "that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police power is allowed would
produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served
than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions"); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[L]iability might also encourage municipalities to err on the constitutional side of police
power regulations, and to develop internal rules and operating procedures to minimize
overzealous regulatory attempts.").
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to develop optimal takings rules without accounting for the varying
state law frameworks already in place.
These difficulties help explain a pattern in which the Court's
action effectively delegates to the state courts the responsibility for
policing restrictive land use regulation. The next Part explores the
implication of that delegation for Williamson County's second
ripeness requirement.
C. Takings Federalism and the Williamson Qounty Ripeness
Requirement
Federalism concerns provide a basis for the Supreme Court's
deference to the state courts in takings cases. Many of the same
concerns provide an even stronger basis for concentrating takings
litigation in the state courts-the ultimate effect of the second
Williamson County ripeness requirement.
1. Potential for Intrusion on State Prerogatives
The preceding Part demonstrates that any takings determination
made by the U.S. Supreme Court would inevitably depend in large
measure on the Court's assessment of the content of background
state law. Avoiding such assessments-which ultimately fall within
the province of state supreme courts-furnishes one reason for the
Court's pattern of deference to state takings determinations.'97 But
if the Supreme Court were to assume a more active role in review-
ing takings claims, the Court would at least be evaluating those
claims after the parties have had an opportunity to make a record
in state court.'98 And that record would give the state supreme court
197. Avoiding federal court assessments of state law issues intertwined with federal
constitutional claims has also served as the basis for Pullman abstention doctrine. R.R.
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). As Professor Althouse has written:
When a federal court abstains under Pullman, it enlists the state court's help in
answering a state law question in the hope that it might thereby avoid the task
of deciding a federal constitutional question. The state court thus relieves the
federal court ... of a difficult task in an area in which the state court possesses
special authority.
Althouse, supra note 191, at 979 (footnotes omitted).
198. Gregory Stein has noted that
[tihe need for concrete facts is acute in land use law, where so much litigation
arises out of local ordinances about which there may be little reported case law.
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an opportunity to make relevant determinations about the content
of state law before the challenged regulation became effective.
Moreover, if uncertainty about state law issues remained, the U.S.
Supreme Court would be free to remand for determination of open
state law issues. 1'
By contrast, if federal district courts were free to hear takings
claims in the first instance, their determinations would not have the
benefit of any comparable record with respect to state law. °0
Appellate review would pass through the federal courts of appeals,
bypassing altogether the state supreme courts, who remain the
ultimate expositors of state property law.20 1 Of course, theoretically
a federal court of appeals could certify questions of state law for
resolution by a state supreme court, but certification procedures are
typically used in diversity cases. 20 2 Whether federal courts would be
With a wide variety of different municipalities enacting land use laws and with
few of these laws ever reaching the courts, those courts that are called upon to
construe these statutes and ordinances need as complete a factual record as
possible, so as to avoid making overly broad pronouncements.
Stein, supra note 33, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
199. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (requiring that
the state "identify background principles of nuisance and property law" before it can defend
itself from a takings claim).
200. Barry Friedman, generally an advocate of narrow preclusion rules and of an expanded
role for England reservations, recognizes that, in general, "federal courts should not decide
novel state law questions if they need not." Friedman, supra note 14, at 1237. Professor
Friedman notes that when "a case that implicates state interests is allocated to federal court,
[state] interests are sacrificed." Id. at 1226.
201. Cf. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988) (emphasizing the
importance of Virginia 'law's authoritative construction from the Virginia Supreme Court);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ('This Court ... repeatedly has held that state
courts are the ultimate expositors of state law... and that we are bound by their constructions
except in extreme circumstances ....") (citations omitted).
As Professor Althouse has put it, "[sitate law means what the state supreme court says it
means.... It is 'infallible' in the special sense of a court at the top of a hierarchy of
interpretation: infallible because it is final." Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying
Power of the State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial
Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 MD. L. REV. 508, 517 (2002); see also Althouse,
supra note 181, at 1512 (noting absence of state court review of erroneous federal decisions
about state law); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through
the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1687 (1992) ("When federal judges make state
law-and we do, by whatever euphemism one chooses to call it-judges who are not selected
under the state's system and who are not answerable to its constituency are undertaking an
inherent state court function.").
202. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power ofFederal Courts To Certify
Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1682-90 (2003) (tracing growth of
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willing to make liberal use of those procedures in federal question
cases is unclear.2 °3
2. Uniformity
Because of the disparities among the property laws of the several
states, national uniformity in takings law is neither attainable nor
desirable.0 4 But uniformity within the confines of any individual
state remains a desirable objective.20 5 Abaidoning the Williamson
County ripeness requirement would undermine the uniformity
objective.
If federal courts were to hear takings claims in the first instance,
they would be unlikely to consider themselves bound by state court
decisions on matters of federal constitutional law. Conversely, with
respect to claims brought in state court, those courts would not
regard themselves as bound by federal circuit or district court
decisions, both because the background issues essential to evaluat-
ing takings claims are questions of state law, and because federal
court of appeals decisions are not binding on state supreme courts,
even with respect to questions of federal constitutional law. 0 6
certification as a response to the Supreme Court's holdings that Pullman abstention was not
available in pure diversity cases).
203. Moreover, not all state courts would be necessarily willing to answer the certified
questions. See Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) ("California ... has
rejected one-third of the cases [that the Ninth Circuit has] certified to it since the [state
certification] rule went into effect."). See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating
Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges'Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975,
982 (2004) (citing Kremen for the proposition that "some state courts are, for one reason or
another, declining a substantial percentage of federal court certification requests").
By contrast, Professor Clark has argued that "federal courts should ... [employ] a
presumption in favor of certification whenever they are called upon to resolve an unsettled
question of state law that would entail the exercise of significant policymaking discretion
more appropriately left to the states." Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1459, 1549 (1997).
204. Hence, the takings doctrine differs sharply from other federal law, in which Professor
Friedman has argued that uniformity and assuring the supremacy of federal law militate in
favor of federal jurisdiction and federal resolution of issues of federal law. See Friedman,
supra note 14, at 1241.
'205. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1938) (criticizing the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), because "[i]n attempting to promote uniformity of
law throughout the United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the
administration of the law of the State").
206. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (N.J. 1990) (holding
294
2006] THE DEMISE OF FEDERAL TAKINGS LITIGATION
Potential conflicts between state and federal approaches within
a single state present difficulties different in kind from disparities
in approaches from one state to another. The state law foundations
of property law make disparities across state lines acceptable and
expected. The general principle that like litigants should be treated
alike would not mandate Supreme Court intervention. By contrast,
differences within a state are not consistent with prevailing legal
norms, 20 7 and the Supreme Court is the only institution in a position
to resolve those conflicts. Supreme Court intervention, in turn,
would involve an expenditure of Supreme Court resources dispro-
portionate to the guidance value Supreme Court decisions would
provide. The ripeness doctrine avoids these difficulties.
3. Comparison with Diversity Cases
One response to concerns about preserving state prerogatives
and uniformity is that the very same concerns exist with respect to
all diversity jurisdiction. When citizens from different states litigate
state law issues, they can proceed in federal court, whereas litigants
from the same state are limited to state court. The result is that
state courts and federal courts decide precisely the same issues,
thereby reducing the potential for uniformity. Yet neither Congress
nor the Supreme Court has acted to abolish diversity jurisdiction.
Three significant differences, however, weaken the force of any
analogy between takings claims and diversity cases. First, in
diversity cases, the Rules of Decision Act2 8 binds federal courts to
that lower federal court decisions are not binding on the New Jersey Supreme Court);
Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345,348 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that Second
Circuit decisions on matters of federal law, including federal constitutional law, are not
binding on New York Court of Appeals). See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the
Crystal Ball Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use To Ascertain Federal Law,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1151-68 (1999) (cataloguing various approaches state courts
take to determinations by lower federal courts); Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower
Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 CoLuM. L. REV. 943,946-47 (1948) (arguing that
federal court decisions should not be binding on state courts).
207. Thus, in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,234 (1991), the Court held that
federal courts of appeal could not engage in deferential appellate review of district court
decisions on matters of state law, largely because "deferential appellate review invites
divergent development of state law among the federal trial courts even within a single State."
See also Friedman, supra note 14, at 1240-41 (arguing that "there is no reason for federal
courts to decide novel state law questions").
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
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apply state law, and decisions of the state supreme court are
authoritative. 9 Federal courts cannot assert a right to independent
interpretation of state law.2 10 By contrast, when issues of federal
constitutional law arise, federal and state supreme courts have
coequal status as interpreters, equally subject to review by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Supreme Court intervention would be the only
mechanism for resolving conflicts. At the same time, unlike typical
federal question cases, in which the Supreme Court is ultimately
likely to step in to resolve significant disputers about the meaning of
a federal statute or constitutional provision, in takings cases the
Court has signaled an intention not to intervene, and instead to
delegate primary responsibility to state courts.211
Second, when parties litigate ordinary state law issues, many
potential plaintiffs are limited to a single forum: state court. As a
result, state precedents will inevitably emerge to provide federal
courts with guidance in resolving the issues that arise in diversity
cases.212 By contrast, if the Court were to abandon the Williamson
County ripeness requirement, plaintiffs in many states-particular-
209. As Justice Brandeis put it in Erie, "whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
210. Indeed, in Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 234, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
of appeal must engage in de novo review of district court decisions on state law issues, in part
to diminish the likelihood that the substantive rule applied will depend on choice of forum.
Nevertheless, as Professor Althouse has noted, state supreme courts never have the
opportunity to review erroneous federal decisions about state law. Althouse, supra note 181,
at 1512; see also Nash, supra note 202, at 1679-80 (noting that state courts often do not have
the opportunity to review questions of state law brought in federal courts).
211. See generally Sterk, supra note 15, at 237-54 (discussing the doctrinal implications of
Supreme Court review of state court takings cases).
212. Judge Posner has nevertheless noted that diversity jurisdiction limits the opportunity
of state courts to fashion state common law. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 217-19 (1996); see also L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a Parallel Universe:
Erie's Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction, Georgia Conflict of Laws Questions in Contracts Cases
in the Eleventh Circuit, and Certification Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 532 (1995)
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction "siphon[s] away the opportunity to resolve cases at the
state level that would enrich and refine the body of state law to which federal and state judges
could refer with confidence").
Judge Posner also notes that many federal courts have resorted to deciding state law
questions based on federal precedent, leading to separate lines of precedent, each purporting
to expound state law. POSNER, supra, at 219; see also Sloviter, supra note 201, at 1681-82
(citing Posner for the proposition that "some evidence suggests that federal courts have shown
a preference for citing federal decisions on state law instead of state decisions at rates
approaching pre-Erie levels").
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ly those that define property rights narrowly-would funnel the vast
bulk of takings litigation into federal court. That might diminish
concerns about uniformity, but would simultaneously exacerbate the
intrusion on state prerogatives to define property rights.
Third, when diversity cases present critical unresolved issues of
state property law, federal courts may invoke the abstention
doctrine to assure state court resolution of those issues. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, in which the Supreme
Court sustained a federal district court's decision to abstain from
deciding whether the city had authority to exercise condemnation
power, is the leading case.21 The city had instituted state court
proceedings to effect a taking, but the landowner removed to federal
district court based on diversity of citizenship, and challenged the
city's authority, under Louisiana law, to exercise eminent domain
power.214 The federal district judge, confronted with a Louisiana
statute appearing to confer that power on cities, and the state
attorney general's opinion from another case suggesting that cities
lacked such power, stayed the proceeding pending resolution of the
issue by the Louisiana Supreme Court.1 5 The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the stay:
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district
judge, when his familiarity with the problems of local law so
counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state
statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak defini-
tively-the courts of the State under whose statute eminent
domain is sought to be exercised ....26
The Court added, in words that also characterize takings cases, that
"[t]he issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation
interpreted in local settings."'  And in a subsequent case-also
involving interpretation of state law property rights-the Court
emphasized the abstention doctrine's role in assuring "that the
213. 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959). For more extensive discussion of the development (and limits)
of abstention doctrine, see Clark, supra note 203, at 1517-35; Lewis Yewlin, Note, Burford
Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 1871, 1877-93 (1999).
214. Louisiana Power, 360 U.S. at 25.
215. Id. at 30.
216. Id. at 29.
217. Id. at 28.
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parties in this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law
which will apply to all other businesses and landowners." '218
The effect of abstention in cases like Thibodaux is not merely a
stay, but in effect a dismissal, of the federal court action, despite the
statutory grant of federal diversity jurisdiction.219 The abstention
doctrine is not, by its terms, available in federal takings cases,
because takings cases present a mix of state and federal questions.
But the problem of inequitable administration arises in both
contexts. The Williamson County ripeness doctrine provides a
substitute for abstention, assuring that takings claims are resolved
in a single forum: state court, the forum best equipped to resolve
those claims.
218. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (per curiam). Kaiser
Steel involved the "public use" provision of the New Mexico Constitution. Id. at 593-94. The
issue was whether a state statute authorizing a trespass over private lands to obtain access
to water rights constituted a taking for private use in violation of the constitutional provision.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the federal district court had properly stayed the
complaining landowner's diversity action so that the New Mexico state courts could resolve
the issue. Id. at 594.
The Court has also developed a parallel abstention doctrine for when the exercise of federal
jurisdiction would interfere with a complex state regulatory scheme in which the state courts
play an integral role. Thus, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943), the Court
ordered the federal district court to abstain from hearing an action to enjoin a Texas Railroad
Commission order granting a permit to drill four wells in an East Texas oil field. The case
turned on construction of an exception to an administrative rule mandating minimum spacing
between oil wells. Id. at 322. The Texas legislature had centralized review of Commission
orders in the state courts of a particular county. Id. at 325. The Supreme Court noted that the
state courts had power to formulate standards for the Commission's administrative practice,
and observed that, "[a]s a practical matter, the federal courts [could] make small contribution
to the well organized system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide....
Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy, are
the inevitable product of this double system of review." Id. at 327.
For an argument that the Court has sometimes improperly conflated Thibodaux abstention,
which rests on the potential for inequitable administration of the laws, with Burford
abstention, which rests on the need to avoid interference with state regulatory schemes, see
Yewlin, supra note 213, at 1889-93. But see Clark, supra note 203, at 1517-23 (rooting both
Burford abstention and Thibodaux abstention in Erie's concern that adjustments in state
policy be made by state rather than federal courts).
219. See Clark, supra note 203, at 1528-29 (noting that stay in cases of Thibodaux
abstention, unlike Pullman abstention stays, "have virtually the same effect as a dismissal"
because "there may be little or nothing left for the federal court to do after the state court
renders its judgment").
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4. The Scope of the Ripeness Doctrine
The Williamson County ripeness doctrine rests on the primacy of
state law in defining property rights. The argument for barring
takings claims from federal court, however, is far less persuasive
when the aggrieved landowner contends that the state's action
falls afoul of one of the per se rules developed by the Supreme
Court. From a formal perspective, of course, takings claims all
share the same feature the Court identified in Williamson County:
no unconstitutional taking has occurred until the state has denied
compensation to the landowner. When state or municipal action
transgresses one of the Court's per se rules, however, the substan-
tive character of the takings claim differs in one significant aspect:
the merits of the claim do not typically depend on the content of
state law.
Consider, for instance, the rule that permanent physical
occupations always require compensation. Application of the rule
requires no investigation of background state law. Similarly, the
Nollan/Dolan nexus rule requires little understanding of back-
ground state law. Nollan and Dolan require a court to evaluate
whether the exaction demanded by the municipality as a condition
for development is reasonably related to the justification that
entitled the municipality to restrict development in the first place.2 °
That evaluation is entirely independent of background state law. In
cases like these, the principal reason for channeling takings cases
to state courts simply does not exist. As a result, one may reason-
ably argue for dispensing with the second Williamson County
ripeness requirement and permitting a landowner to proceed
directly to federal court.
There are, however, countervailing considerations. First, at least
one of the per se rules-the Lucas rule that requires compensation
whenever a regulation leaves a landowner with no productive use
of the land--does depend, in part, on background state law: the
Court built in an exception to the rule in cases where background
state law would have precluded productive use of the land.22'
Second, and more important, development of facts is often necessary
to determine whether a landowner's claim falls within one of the per
220. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
221. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992).
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se rules. Hence, a rule that permitted federal review in claims
premised on per se rules would often waste judicial resources: a
federal court would have to hear the complaint, only to dismiss on
ripeness grounds if it concluded that the claim did not fall within a
per se rule. Third, landowners often advance more than one takings
claim in the same action.222 If federal jurisdiction turned on the
nature of the takings claim, many takings claims would have to be
split into federal and state court components, again requiring
duplication of effort.
These countervailing considerations suggest that permitting
federal courts to review takings claims founded on violations of per
se rules would be unwise in practice, even if, in principle, no reason
would prevent federal review. If the Court is to maintain the second
Williamson County ripeness requirement for other takings claims,
the requirement should also bar claims based on per se rules.
CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion in San Remo does effectively bar federal
takings claims from federal court. Although the Court's opinion, by
its terms, determined only that federal takings claims are not
exempt from the mandate of the full faith and credit statute, the
opinion must be read against a background of state preclusion
doctrine. In general, state claim preclusion doctrine-not issue
preclusion doctrine-will present the most serious obstacle to
federal review of takings claims, and will leave no path for the land
use litigator to navigate between the Scylla of ripeness require-
ments and the Charybdis of preclusion rules.
The counterintuitive conclusion that federal courts may not
hear federal constitutional takings claims naturally provokes
reexamination of the principles that lead to that conclusion. In light
of the Supreme Court's unshakably broad construction of the full
faith and credit statute, that reexamination has focused on the
wisdom of the Court's ripeness doctrine. But reexamination reveals
that the unusual Williamson County ripeness doctrine tracks the
unusual nature of federal takings claims, which are heavily
dependent on the content of background state law. In light of that
222. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 606-07 (2001) (rejecting a Lucas
claim while remanding for consideration of a Penn Central claim).
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dependence, the Supreme Court's takings doctrine effectively
delegates much enforcement of the Takings Clause to the state
courts, and that delegation will be far more effective if takings
litigation is confined to one court system rather than two.
